

VZCZCXRO8284
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4346 3291345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251345Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8179
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004346

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [PNAT](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: PURSUING AN ACSA WITH THE GOI

REF: A. STATE 39912
[1](#)B. BAGHDAD 1639

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons (a), (b), and (d).

[1](#)1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: As Iraqis move toward a more mature security relationship with the USG, we believe DoD should pursue an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense as soon as we have taken the necessary steps to ensure the Iraqis are capable of managing an ACSA. An ACSA would provide legitimate means, absent at this time, for the U.S. and Iraqi military to exchange logistical support on a reimbursable basis. We understand the Department has already granted C-175 negotiation authority to DoD, and that USCENTCOM also wants to proceed. END SUMMARY.

Training on an ACSA

[1](#)2. (C/REL MNF-I) Before any formal U.S.-Iraqi ACSA negotiations begin, we ask that DoD develop and embed into the rollout concept a training component for a discrete number of MoD and subordinate officials to handle the budgeting and management functions associated with an ACSA.

[1](#)3. (C/REL MNF-I) To create the right conditions to begin formal negotiations, we suggest senior MOD officials visit mature ACSA programs resident in neighboring Arab countries such as Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan.

Accountability

[1](#)4. (C/REL MNF-I) A U.S.-Iraqi ACSA should stipulate strict conditions under which the exchange of goods and services can take place, to include a provision for MOD receipt of periodic statements and identification of the discrete team of MOD officials who can approve associated support.

[1](#)5. (C/REL MNF-I) Iraqi forces currently require substantial field logistical support. Much is provided at no cost and with limited Iraqi accountability. Since Iraqi forces will likely require substantial future logistical support, regular periodic accounting statements and close oversight are critical.

FUTURE POTENTIAL

[1](#)6. (C/REL MNF-I) At a suitable time during the DoD-Iraqi MoD ACSA development process, we will encourage the Iraqi MoD and MoI to sign a parallel agreement allowing Ministry of Interior's (MoI) potential indirect use of the ACSA.

COMMENT

[17](#). (C/REL MNF-I) In pursuing an ACSA, DoD should recognize Iraq's budget execution capacity limitations, probable inability to provide adequate reimbursement through goods and services, and lack of a mature budget oversight process. Adapting ACSA implementation to these factors will be critical for success.

KHALILZAD